Why international instruments to combat nuclear proliferation succeed or fail: A study of the interaction of international and domestic level factors.

摘要

International nonproliferation efforts that are implemented by the international nonproliferation community to prevent nuclear proliferation dates back to the 1950's. While these efforts have helped ensure the vast majority of nations decide against pursuing a nuclear weapons program, there have been cases where those efforts have failed. This fact raises a fundamental question that this dissertation seeks to address: Why have international efforts been successful in convincing some national decision-makers that they should not pursue a nuclear weapons program, even when they have the means and a rationale to do so, and why have international nonproliferation efforts failed in convincing other national decision makers to puruse a nuclear weapons program. Under what conditions have international nonproliferation efforts been successful, and which nonproliferation instruments have been most effective in preventing nuclear proliferation. This dissertation will show that successful international efforts shape domestic nuclear weapons decision-making under the following circumstances: when the international nonproliferation community understands the domestic motivations of a proliferant state for nuclear weapons; when the international nonproliferation community devotes attention to preventing that state from acquiring nuclear weapons; when the international nonproliferation community has leverage to influence the motivations of the state; and when the international nonproliferation community offers incentives to the proliferant state that are directly tailored to the state's predominant motivations. Also important is the type of motivation underlying the state's efforts for developing a nuclear weapons program, or for acquiring nuclear weapons. The dissertation argues that when a state's motivations are predominately based on a desire to gain power or prestige, that state's decision making process will be less receptive to international nonproliferation efforts than if those motivations are predominately based on security or economic considerations.