Respectful vagueness: The continual utility of strategic ambiguity as the primary deterrent to conflict in the Taiwan Strait.

摘要

Since the 1970s, strategic ambiguity, the deterrence conflict through vagueness and imprecision in diplomacy, as well as possible military intervention, has played an integral part in the preservation of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. However, with the inauguration of George W. Bush, this method of conflict management has come under much criticism from those who favour the replacement of ambiguity with a more clear and concise formula. To these advocates of strategic clarity, ambiguity has outlived its usefulness and is consequently an impediment towards prospects for a peaceful resolution. This thesis will argue that such an approach is incorrect. Strategic ambiguity's method of deterrence is not only superior to the methodologies proposed by the advocates of strategic clarity, but is currently the only means to achieve successful deterrence. Only through the intrinsic flexibility of ambiguity are the goals and objectives of United States, the People's Republic of China and Taiwan successfully balanced.