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Intersubjectivity: A phenomenological contribution to collective intentionality.


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This project develops a phenomenological account of intersubjectivity in the spirit of Edmund Husserl. The project has two main divisions. In the first division, I critically address the idea of collective consciousness. In the second division, I examine the phenomenological analysis of plural subjects and contrast it with Margaret Gilbert's view. Throughout, I advocate for subjective individualism, the position that all intentionality and consciousness is properly understood as only being attributable to individual subjects. As with John Searle and Gilbert, I accept that this position is consistent with formal collectivism, the position that one's intentional acts can take on a plural form in a way that is non-reducible to singular intentions; i.e. there are we-intentions that cannot be adequately accounted for as the sum of I-intentions.;The first two chapters engage in phenomenologically and metaphysically motivated arguments against the possibility of collective consciousness. I organize my argumentations around Kay Mathiesen's paper, "Collective Consciousness". Mathiesen claims there is a phenomenological case to be made for collective consciousness. I clarify her argument, and show that there is no adequate phenomenological basis for collective consciousness, despite there being good evidence for collective intentions. I argue that there are not sufficient grounds to believe that plural subjects take on or participate in any consciousness beyond that which is their own. Theories of collective consciousness are often motivated either by 1) that groups or collectives can bear predicates that their individuals either do not possess or whose individual members, on their own, might affirm the contrary; or 2) the recent acceptance of a more robust role for socially conditioned beliefs. I argue that these are insufficient grounds for extending the notion of consciousness to groups or collectives, i.e. plural subjects.;The third chapter addresses an old criticism of Edmund Husserl's account of intersubjectivity that has been given new form in Robert Sokolowski's Phenomenology of the Human Person. I argue against Sokolowski's conclusions and show that the line of argument he takes runs counter to the critique of psychologism that motivated the development of phenomenology in Logical Investigations. As such, either one falls back into the possibility of psychologism, or sociologism, or one has to take an approach to intersubjectivity more closely related to that Husserl took.;Chapter four builds on David Carr's overlooked paper on plural subjects from a phenomenological perspective. I conjoin Carr's analysis with John Searle's work on collective intentionality to offer a robust outline of a phenomenological account of plural subjects. Hans Bernhard Schmid has argued for a thorough collectivism in contrast to the subjective individualism I here give articulation to. I respond to Schmid's arguments, showing that his position is unworkable and does not represent the phenomena well.;Chapter five engages in a critical appraisal of Margaret Gilbert's theory of plural subjects. In contrasting the phenomenological account developed in the previous chapter, I demonstrate problems underlying Gilbert's theory. I trace the source of these problems to lie primarily in the ambiguity latent in the English language use of "intentionality" and argue that the more basic phenomenological account of plural subjects is necessary background to Gilbert's view. I do not take issue with most of Gilbert's analyses as they function at the level of action-oriented analysis. To this chapter is appended a discussion of how Aron Gurwitsch's phenomenology of the social world can serve to supplement both the Husserlian view.;The final chapter responds to two related challenges to Husserlian phenomenological method that are motivated by realist concerns. First, Barry Smith argues that Husserl is ill equipped to answer for there being a plurality of worlds, a charge that is echoed in his criticisms of Searle's theory of collective intentionality. A world, in the phenomenological sense, is a totality of reference or meaning. As such, it is acceptable to speak of each individual or community as having its own world. A potential problem arises in that there may be disagreement across worlds. Establishing a parallel with proposals of Martha Nussbaum, and building on Carr's work, I argue that shared experiences and a shared framework for experience represent an adequate basis for plurality and that differences can largely be accounted for as unproblematic where one holds to the Aristotelian principle that particularism does not entail relativism. Smith's intuition may be correct that such a move may strengthen the case for some form of realism being wedded to phenomenological theory, though that is properly left outside strictly phenomenological concerns. Second, I respond to Han Georg Gadamer's criticisms based on the notion of intentional horizons and how to best understand the social horizons of consciousness. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)
机译:该项目以埃德蒙·胡塞尔(Edmund Husserl)的精神发展了主体间性的现象学解释。该项目有两个主要部门。在第一部分中,我批判性地论述了集体意识的概念。在第二部分中,我研究了复数主题的现象学分析,并将其与玛格丽特·吉尔伯特的观点进行了对比。在整个过程中,我主张主观个人主义,即所有意图和意识都应适当理解为仅归因于个体主体的立场。就像约翰·塞尔(John Searle)和吉尔伯特(Gilbert)一样,我接受这一立场与正式的集体主义是一致的,这种立场是一个人的故意行为可以采取一种不可简化为单一意图的方式进行复数形式。即,我们的意图不能充分地解释为我的意图的总和。前两章涉及现象学和形而上学的论证,反对集体意识的可能性。我围绕凯·马蒂森(Kay Mathiesen)的论文《集体意识》组织辩论。 Mathiesen声称,有一种现象学上的理由可以证明集体意识。我澄清她的论点,并表明尽管有足够的证据表明了集体意图,但对于集体意识没有足够的现象学基础。我认为,没有足够的理由相信多元化的主体会承担或参与超出其自身意识的任何意识。集体意识理论通常是由以下动机激发的:1)群体或集体可以断言其个人不拥有或者其个人成员可以独立地断言相反的事实;或2)最近接受了针对社会条件的信念的更强有力的作用。我认为这些不足以将意识的概念扩展到群体或集体即多元主体。第三章论述了对埃德蒙·胡塞尔对主体间性的陈旧批评,这种批评在罗伯特·索科洛夫斯基的《人类现象学》中有了新的形式。 。我反对索科洛夫斯基的结论,并表明他所采取的论点与对逻辑学的批判背道而驰,后者引起了逻辑研究中现象学的发展。这样一来,要么要么退回到心理主义或社会主义的可能性之中,要么要么就采取一种与胡塞尔所采取的关系更紧密的主体间性的方法;第四章建立在戴维·卡尔(David Carr)从现象学的角度对复数主题的被忽视的论文的基础上。我将卡尔的分析与约翰·塞尔(John Searle)关于集体意向性的研究结合起来,以提供对复数主题的现象学解释的有力概述。汉斯·伯恩哈德·施密德(Hans Bernhard Schmid)主张建立彻底的集体主义,与我在此阐述的主观个人主义形成鲜明对比。我对施密德的论点作出回应,表明他的立场是行不通的,不能很好地代表这一现象。第五章对玛格丽特·吉尔伯特的复数学科理论进行了批判性评价。与上一章中发展的现象学解释相反,我展示了吉尔伯特理论所隐含的问题。我追究这些问题的根源,主要在于英语中“意图性”使用中的歧义性,并认为对复数主题更基本的现象学解释是吉尔伯特观点的必要背景。我对Gilbert的大多数分析都没有异议,因为它们在面向行动的分析级别起作用。本章还讨论了阿伦·古维茨(Aron Gurwitsch)的社会世界现象学如何可以补充胡塞尔人的观点。最后一章回应了由现实主义关注引起的对胡塞尔人现象学方法的两个相关挑战。首先,巴里·史密斯(Barry Smith)辩称,胡塞尔没有能力回答存在多个世界的问题,这一指控在他对塞尔对集体意图理论的批评中得到了回应。在现象学意义上,世界是指称或意义的整体。因此,可以说每个人或社区都有自己的世界。一个潜在的问题是,世界之间可能存在分歧。我认为,与玛莎·努斯鲍姆(Martha Nussbaum)的建议相类似,并以卡尔的工作为基础,我认为共享的经验和经验的共享框架为多元性奠定了充分的基础,而在坚持亚里士多德原理的前提下,差异可以说是毫无问题的。特殊主义并不意味着相对主义。史密斯的直觉可能是正确的,这样的举动可能会加强某种形式的现实主义被束缚到现象学理论上的理由,尽管这被严格地排除在严格的现象学关注之外。第二,我回应韩格奥尔格·加达默尔(Han Georg Gadamer)基于故意视野的观念以及如何最好地理解意识的社会视野的批评。 (摘要由UMI缩短。)


  • 作者

    Chelstrom, Eric.;

  • 作者单位

    State University of New York at Buffalo.;

  • 授予单位 State University of New York at Buffalo.;
  • 学科 Philosophy.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2010
  • 页码 315 p.
  • 总页数 315
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

  • 入库时间 2022-08-17 11:36:56


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