首页> 外文会议>International Conference on Economy, Judicature, Administration and Humanitarian Projects >Salary Incentives, Corporate Risk Exposure and Financial Investment: Based on the Empirical Data of China's A-share Listed Companies
【24h】

Salary Incentives, Corporate Risk Exposure and Financial Investment: Based on the Empirical Data of China's A-share Listed Companies

机译:薪酬激励,企业风险曝光和金融投资:基于中国A股上市公司的经验数据

获取原文

摘要

This paper selects A-share listed companies (non-financial industries) from 2010 to 2017 as a sample, and uses multiple linear regression models to empirically analyze the relationship between management compensation incentives, corporate risk-taking and corporate financial investment, and the paper also analyzes the mediating effect of enterprise risk taking between salary incentives and financial investment. The research results show that: management compensation incentives and corporate financial investment are positively related; management compensation incentives are significantly positively related to corporate risk exposure; risk exposure plays a partial intermediary role between management compensation incentives and corporate financial investment, namely management, and the impact of compensation incentives on corporate financial investment is partly achieved through risk exposure.
机译:本文从2010年到2017年选择A股上市公司(非金融行业)作为一个示例,并使用多个线性回归模型来凭经验分析管理补偿激励,企业风险和公司金融投资与本文之间的关系。还分析了企业风险在薪酬激励和金融投资之间的调解效应。研究结果表明:管理赔偿奖励措施和公司金融投资正相关;管理赔偿奖励措施与企业风险敞口有着明显的相关性;风险曝光在管理赔偿激励措施和公司金融投资之间发挥部分中介作用,即管理层,并通过风险敞口部分实现了对公司金融投资的赔偿激励措施的影响。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号