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The Empirical Study on CEO Power and Investment Efficiency

机译:首席执行官电力与投资效率的实证研究

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In the economic organization, CEO is the highest administrative official responsible for the routine business in an enterprise. The size of the CEO's power has great impact on CEO's decision making, and the interest of stakeholders. But, academia is inconsistent to the influence of CEO power, one is "power beyond" and the other is "power protection". "Power beyond" thinks too much power can let CEO give up the company's interests for personal gain. "Power protection" thinks high power of CEO is advantageous to the development of the company. This paper builds comprehensive measure CEO rights of four dimensions first, and examines that CEO power influence on investment efficiency with method of multivariate regression analysis, by using 2010-2014 data of Chinese listed companies. The conclusion shows that the greater the CEO power is, the higher the investment efficiency will be. This paper results support "power protection "and provide empirical evidence for the theory "power protection".
机译:在经济组织中,首席执行官是负责企业常规业务的行政官员。首席执行官权力的规模对CEO的决策产生了很大影响,以及利益攸关方的利益。但是,学术界是首席执行官权力的影响不一致,一个是“超越”,另一个是“电力保护”。 “超越”认为太多的力量可以让首席执行官放弃公司的个人收益利益。 “电力保护”认为,首席执行官的大力是有利的,对公司的发展有利。本文建立了全面的措施首席执行官的四个维度,并通过使用2010-2014中国上市公司数据,研究了CEO对投资效率对投资效率的影响,通过使用2010-2014中国上市公司的数据进行了多元回归分析。结论表明,首席执行官能力越大,投资效率越高。本文的结果支持“电力保护”,并为理论“电力保护”提供实证证据。

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