首页> 外文会议>International Conference on Economics, Management, Law and Education >Design of Dynamic Incentive Contract of Sales Personnel Based on Multitask Objectives
【24h】

Design of Dynamic Incentive Contract of Sales Personnel Based on Multitask Objectives

机译:基于多任务目标的销售人员动态激励合同设计

获取原文

摘要

Based on the multi-task principal-agent model proposed by Holmstrom, the article divides the sales staff's work into two dimensions: pursuit of current performance and improvement of corporate reputation. The single-cycle static contract and multi-cycle dynamic contract were constructed respectively, and the changes of sales staff's work input and enterprise income under the two types of incentive contracts were compared and numerical analysis was carried out. The results show that when the company signs a dynamic incentive contract with the sales staff, the sales staff will make greater efforts for the long-term reputation of the company. The better the corporate reputation, the greater the efforts of sales people to increase their reputation. The greater the sales staff's efforts to contribute to the output in the current period, the more the sales staff and the company pay attention to the short-term benefits. The dynamic incentive contract for businesses and salespeople is Pareto improvement.
机译:基于霍尔斯特罗姆提出的多任务委托 - 代理模型,该文章将销售人员的工作分为二维:追求目前的绩效和企业声誉的提高。分别建造了单周期静态合同和多周期动态合同,比较了两种激励合同下的销售人员的工作投入和企业收入的变化,并进行了数值分析。结果表明,当公司与销售人员签署动态激励合同时,销售人员将为公司的长期声誉做出更大的努力。公司声誉越好,销售人员越大的努力提高了他们的声誉。销售人员努力为目前贡献产量越大,销售人员越多,销售人员和公司要关注短期福利。企业和销售人员的动态激励合同是帕累托改进。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号