首页> 外文会议>International Conference on Nuclear Criticality Safety >THE APPLICATION OF ALARP TO LEGACY RESIDUES RECOVERY PROCESSES ON THE SPRINGFIELDS SITE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
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THE APPLICATION OF ALARP TO LEGACY RESIDUES RECOVERY PROCESSES ON THE SPRINGFIELDS SITE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

机译:ALARP在英国斯普林菲尔德遗产恢复过程中的应用

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In the United Kingdom, the legal framework for nuclear safety is established principally through the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 (HSAW74) and the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 (NIA 65). Under HSAW74, employers are responsible for reducing risks, so far as is reasonably practicable, to their workers and others (including the public). This responsibility is elaborated further in relation to nuclear sites by NIA65, which establishes a nuclear site licensing regime whereby Nuclear Site Licenses are granted and subsequently regulated by the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) within the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). In essence, ensuring that a risk has been reduced to "As Low As Reasonably Practicable" (ALARP) is about weighing-up the risk against the sacrifice needed to reduce it. To avoid having to make this sacrifice, the Nuclear Site License holder (the Site Licensee) must be able to show that it would be grossly disproportionate to the benefits of risk reduction that would be achieved. Using "reasonably practicable" allows the ONR to set goals for the Site Licensee, rather than being prescriptive. This flexibility can be a great advantage in that it allows the Site Licensee to consider a variety of options, and hence supports innovative approaches. However, it has drawbacks in that it requires both the Site Licensee and the regulators to exercise judgement; in reality, many decisions about risks and the measures that achieve ALARP are not straight-forward. Fortunately, various resources are available to the Site Licensee to aid these decisions. Three key facilities on the Westinghouse, Springfields Fuels Limited site at Preston in the UK (including the National Nuclear Laboratory's Preston Laboratory) undertake the clean-up of legacy residues from both fuel manufacturing operations on the site itself (dating back well over fifty years) and the wider nuclear industry. This paper discusses the key features of these three facilities to illustrate how ALARP considerations have shaped the operating regimes and associated criticality controls in those areas.
机译:在英国,核安全法律框架主要通过1974年(HSAW74)和1965年核设施(NIA 65)的卫生和安全。在HSAW74下,雇主负责减少风险,到目前为止,其工人和其他人(包括公众)是合理的。该责任在NIA65的核景中进一步阐述,该核算局建立了核现场许可制度,核现场许可证被授予并随后由卫生和安全执行官(HSE)内的核监管办公室监管。从本质上讲,确保风险已被降至“尽可能低,即合理切实可行”(ALARP)是关于称量对减少牺牲所需的牺牲的风险。为避免必须制定这种牺牲,核现场许可证持有人(网站被许可人)必须能够表明,与将实现风险降低的益处会严重不成比例。使用“合理切实可行”允许ONR为网站被许可方设定目标,而不是规范性。这种灵活性可以是一个很大的优势,因为它允许网站被许可方考虑各种选项,因此支持创新方法。但是,它有缺点,因为它需要站点被许可方和监管机构进行判决;实际上,关于风险的决定以及实现ALARP的措施并不直接。幸运的是,网站被许可人提供了各种资源,以帮助这些决定。斯普林菲尔德的三个关键设施,斯普林菲尔德在英国的普雷斯顿(包括国家核实验室的普雷斯顿实验室)有限的网站,在网站上的燃料制造业务中进行遗产残留的遗产残留物(约会超过五十年)和更广泛的核工业。本文讨论了这三种设施的关键特征,以说明ALARP考虑因素如何塑造这些地区的操作系统和相关的临界控制。

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