The Executive Compensation Incentive Effectiveness Research of Listed Company of Beijing

摘要

With the separation of the ownership and management right of modern enterprise, asymmetric information between management and owner leads to the principal-agent contradiction. At present, the monetary compensation incentive and equity compensation incentive are regarded as the most direct and effective means to solve the agency problem, and its incentive effect has become the core of corporate governance, which is widely concerned by academic and practical circles. We take the data of Beijing listed companies from 2011 to 2015 as the sample, and then compared the effectiveness of the two incentive means through the panel analysis while considering the lag effect of incentive measures. We found that the monetary compensation incentive and equity compensation incentive are both related to the performance of listed companies in Beijing, and there is a lag; the effect of monetary compensation incentive decreases as time moved which is more likely to lead executives to make short-term profit behaviors. Then we introduce the lagging indicators of performance into the model to control the economic inertia, and found that the monetary compensation incentive is more effective than the equity compensation incentive means by iteration, which has a more significant impact on the executive behavior.