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Analysis of health care payment contract based on the principal-agent theory

机译:基于委托 - 代理理论的医疗支付合同分析

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Health care cost is private information.The information asymmetry about cost is the main factor of holding back the development of medical insurance.Based on the principal-agent theory,this article has studied the separating contracts which includes two kinds of payment contracts and can automatically screen the doctor's cost information.The first is upper limit per capita payment with fewer patients.The second is lower limit per-capita payment with much more patients.Doctors will automatically show their cost information when they choose the payment contracts.The high-cost doctor will choose the first contract and the low-cost doctor will choose the second one.Compared to that under information symmetry,the payment contract under information asymmetry will match fewer patients to the high-cost doctor and pay more to the low-cost doctor which will produce a second-best outcome.
机译:医疗费用是私人信息。信息不对称的成本是持有医疗保险发展的主要因素。基于委托 - 代理理论,本文研究了分离合同,包括两种支付合同,可以自动筛选医生的成本信息。首先是人均支付上限,患者更少。第二个是每首岁的人均支付。在选择付款合同时,DOCTORS将自动显示其成本信息。高成本医生将选择第一份合同,低成本的医生将选择第二个oint.com.cn下的信息对称性,信息不对称下的支付合同将使患者较少,为高成本的医生支付更多的患者,并为低成本的医生支付更多费用这将产生第二次最佳结果。

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