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Intentionality, representation, and anticipation

机译:意向性,代表和预期

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Both Brentano and Merleau-Ponty have developed an account of intentionality, which nevertheless differ profoundly in the following respect. According to Brentano, intentionality mainly is a matter of mental presentations. This marks the beginning of phenomenology's difficult relation with the nature of the intentional reference. MerleanPonty, on the other hand, has situated intentionality on the level of the body, a turn which has important implications for the nature of intentionality. Intentionality no longer is primarily based on having (re)presentations, but is rooted in the dynamics of the living body. To contrast those approaches enables us to make clear in what way intentionality is studied nowadays. On the one hand, intentionality is conceived of as a matter of formal-syntactical causality in cognitive science, and in particular in classical-computational theory. On the other hand, a interactivist approach offers a more MerleanPonty-like point of view, in which autonomy, embodiment and interaction are stressed.
机译:无论布伦塔诺和梅洛 - 庞蒂已经开发了一个帐户意向的,其仍然在以下方面深刻差异。据布伦塔诺,意向主要是心理陈述的问题。现象学与有意参考的性质难以关系,这标志着开始。 MerleanPonty,而另一方面,已经对身体的水平,这对意向性的性质具有重要意义转弯位于意向。意向性不再主要基于具有(再)演示,但植根于活体的动力学。对比这些方法使我们能够以什么方式意向是时下研究清晰。在一方面,意向被设想为正规语法因果关系的认知科学的问题,特别是在古典计算理论。在另一方面,一个interactivist方法提供了一个更MerleanPonty样的观点来看,在其中自主性,实施方式和交互被强调。

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