Game Analysis of Different Agents: Based on Quantification of Chinese FDI Policy (1978-2006)

摘要

The failure of strategy "Market in exchange for Technology" has brought significant change to the policy of FDI in China. Based on the quantification of Chinese FDI policy,this paper finds that: the core goals of Chinese FDI policy have been focused on the introduction of foreign capitals and technological innovation since 1978.The disillusion of Chinese glorious ideals is mainly because: (1) Chinese FDI policy has problems in itself,lack of technological absorption. (2) The policy can't be implemented effectively. Quantifying the goals of Chinese FDI policy,we make a profound game analysis on the related interest groups in the process of implementation. In this paper,it holds the hypotheses that the agents of government represent three levels: nation,department and political leader in charge of the department. During the implementation of policy,the impetus of competence among different agents is the resultant of forces of the three interests mentioned above. In addition,from the inherent demand for fair treatment,domestic enterprises tend to joint venture with foreign companies,regardless of the outcome. This "fiercer" joint venture in turn encourages the central government to issue more such policy and enforce the policy power,which causes the invalid policy to "self-enforcement". Ultimately,it leads to series invalid policies.