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Security Analysis of the Lightweight Block Ciphers XTEA, LED and Piccolo

机译:轻量级分组密码XTEA,LED和短笛的安全性分析

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In this paper, we investigate the security of the lightweight block ciphers against the meet-in-the-middle (MITM) attack. Since the MITM attack mainly exploits low key-dependency in a key expanding function, the block ciphers having a simple key expanding function are likely to be vulnerable to the MITM attack. On the other hand, such a simple key expanding function leads compact implementation, and thus is utilized in several lightweight block ciphers. However, the security of such lightweight block ciphers against the MITM attack has not been studied well so far. We apply the MITM attack to the ciphers, then give more accurate security analysis for them. Specifically, combining thorough analysis with new techniques, we present the MITM attacks on 29, 8, 16, 14 and 21 rounds of XTEA, LED-64, LED-128, Piccolo-80 and Piccolo-128, respectively. Consequently, it is demonstrated that the MITM attack is the most powerful attack in the single-key setting on those ciphers with respect to the number of attacked rounds. Moreover, we consider the possibility of applying the recent speed-up keysearch based on MITM attack to those ciphers.
机译:在本文中,我们研究了轻量级分组密码对中间相遇(MITM)攻击的安全性。由于MITM攻击主要利用密钥扩展功能中的低密钥依赖性,因此具有简单密钥扩展功能的分组密码很容易受到MITM攻击。另一方面,这种简单的密钥扩展功能导致紧凑的实现,因此被用于多种轻量级分组密码中。但是,到目前为止,尚未对此类轻量级分组密码针对MITM攻击的安全性进行深入研究。我们将MITM攻击应用于密码,然后对其进行更准确的安全性分析。具体来说,结合全面的分析与新技术,我们分别在XTEA,LED-64,LED-128,Piccolo-80和Piccolo-128的29、8、16、14和21轮攻击中展示了MITM攻击。因此,证明了相对于被攻击的回合数,MITM攻击是这些密码在单密钥设置中最强大的攻击。此外,我们考虑了将基于MITM攻击的最新加速密钥搜索应用于这些密码的可能性。

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