首页> 外文会议>Information Science and Engineering (ICISE), 2009 >An Equilibrium Study about Spectrum between 'Winner's Curse' and Seller's Earnings Based on Uniform-Price Auction
【24h】

An Equilibrium Study about Spectrum between 'Winner's Curse' and Seller's Earnings Based on Uniform-Price Auction

机译:基于均价拍卖的“赢家的诅咒”与卖方收益之间的频谱均衡研究

获取原文
获取外文期刊封面目录资料

摘要

The auction mechanism of spectrum becomes the focus in China with the issuance of 3G license. The uniform-price auctions which aim to reduce the risk of "winner's curse" and the protection of seller's earnings are proposed to in this paper. A model of seller's earnings and the relevant influent factors is established. The equilibrium status which can reduce the risk of "winner's curse" and guarantee the seller's earnings is also mentioned in this paper.
机译:随着3G牌照的发放,频谱拍卖机制成为中国关注的焦点。本文提出了旨在降低“获胜者诅咒”风险和保护卖方收益的统一价格拍卖。建立了卖方收入和相关影响因素的模型。本文还提到了一种平衡状态,可以降低“赢者的诅咒”风险并保证卖方的收入。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号