Game Analysis On Strategic RD Cooperation Under The Condition Of Uncertainty

摘要

Game theory proposes the decision-making of strategic R&D is a game procedure between behavioral parties. The existing literatures consider R&D cooperation is raised not in the finitely repeated games but in the infinitely repeated games. In fact, however, the practical cooperation can be erected surely in the finitely repeated games with the characters of the small number and the short time, so the phenomena can't be interpreted in the above perspective. This paper maintains the principle that the behavioral parties with bounded rationale wouldn't collaborate with each other until both parties are sure the possibility of the repeated games exceeds a certain value, because in a long run the benefits raised from the repeated cooperations would surpass the short-term benefits in limited non-cooperations. So rational decision-making procedure of R&D cooperation depends on the difference between the long-term benefits in the repeated cooperation and the short-term payoffs in the limited non-cooperation. The conclusion is demonstrated by quantitative analysis.