【24h】

EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION RESEARCH: A BRIEF REVIEW

机译:行政补偿研究:简述

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例

摘要

The separation of ownership and control resulted in agency problem. In order to motivate corporate executives, the owners have to design rational compensation system. The question how to determine executive compensation and how to explain some phenomena of executive compensation has caused an intense debate among economists, accountants, psychologists, human resource specialists and strategic planners for 70 years, and the debate tends to continue. In early stage, agency theory, the mainstream school on the issue, focused on pay-performance sensitivity. Their empirical researches usually didn't find the high correlation between compensation and performance. Lately, human capital school, labor market school and "firm organization" school have improved managerial compensation theory from the aspects of executive human capital, executive market and firm characters. They indicated that executive compensation is separately determined by executive human capital, executive position, executive job character, executive labor market, corporate governance, corporate strategy and corporate character. On the basis of the review, this paper points that future research should pay more attention to the integration of the various theories and construct a synthetical model of executive compensation to drive the field.
机译:所有权和控制权的分离导致代理问题。为了激励企业高管,所有者必须设计合理的薪酬制度。 70年来,如何确定高管薪酬以及如何解释高管薪酬现象的问题引起了经济学家,会计师,心理学家,人力资源专家和战略规划师之间的激烈辩论,而且辩论仍在继续。在早期,代理理论是这个问题上的主流派,主要关注薪酬绩效敏感性。他们的经验研究通常没有发现薪酬与绩效之间的高度相关性。最近,人力资本学校,劳动力市场学校和“公司组织”学校从行政人员人力资本,行政人员市场和公司特征等方面改进了管理人员薪酬理论。他们指出,高管薪酬是由高管人力资本,高管职位,高管职位性质,高管劳动力市场,公司治理,公司战略和公司性质分别确定的。在此基础上,本文指出,今后的研究应更加重视各种理论的融合,构建高管薪酬的综合模型来推动这一领域的发展。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号