Internal Control, Board Structure and Executive Compensation - Performance Sensitivity

摘要

This paper selects the data of Shanghai-Shenzhen A-share companies from 2010 to 2014 and empirically examines the relationship between internal control and board structure characteristics and executive compensation-performance sensitivity to verify whether internal control can effectively affect executive compensation. Sensitivity of performance, and explore the effect of internal control on executive compensation-performance sensitivity under different board structure characteristics, through the study of this paper, in order to provide internal governance for the company and provide external supervision for the government. The empirical results show that: to improve the quality of internal control can significantly increase the executive compensation - performance sensitivity, and the smaller board of directors of the company, the role of internal control is more significant, the independence of the board will also have an impact. The article enriched the empirical evidence of executive compensation incentive research, with a view to providing guidance for corporate governance and government supervision.