Analysis of Market Competition Behavior between Foreign Investing Enterprise and Domestic Investing Enterprise under the Condition of Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions

摘要

Under the condition of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As), the competition between the domestic investing enterprise and foreign investing enterprise results in the optimization of corporate governance of target enterprise. The mechanism of corporate governance optimization can influence the market competition behavior and enter into the maximized objective function as a key variable. Through structuring the Nash-Cournot Game Model, this paper discusses the above-mentioned mechanism and its corresponding consequences. In the model, the characteristics of cross-border M&As are epitomized in the form of the variable of corporate governance optimization. This variable enters into the maximized utility function and influences the output decision and competition behavior of enterprises. The fundamental conclusion this paper drew is: the transnational corporation (TNC) accessing into host country through cross-border M&As will obtain more market share when involves in the Cournot competition with the domestic investing enterprise for the strategic commitment value of the factor of corporate governance optimization, and then enhance the market concentration.