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Intentionality, Representation, and Anticipation

机译:意向性,表示形式和预期

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Both Brentano and Merleau-Ponty have developed an account of intentionality, which nevertheless differ profoundly in the following respect. According to Brentano, intentionality mainly is a matter of mental presentations. This marks the beginning of phenomenology's difficult relation with the nature of the intentional reference. Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, has situated intentionality on the level of the body, a turn which has important implications for the nature of intentionality. Intentionality no longer is primarily based on having (re)presentations, but is rooted in the dynamics of the living body. To contrast those approaches enables us to make clear in what way intentionality is studied nowadays. On the one hand, intentionality is conceived of as a matter of formal-syntactical causality in cognitive science, and in particular in classical-computational theory. On the other hand, a interactivist approach offers a more Merleau-Ponty-like point of view, in which autonomy, embodiment and interaction are stressed.
机译:布伦塔诺(Brentano)和梅洛-庞蒂(Merleau-Ponty)都对目的性进行了描述,但在以下方面却有很大的不同。根据布伦塔诺的观点,意向性主要是心理表现的问题。这标志着现象学与故意指称的本质之间的艰难关系的开始。另一方面,梅洛-庞蒂(Merleau-Ponty)将意向性置于身体的水平上,这一转折对意向性的性质具有重要意义。意向性不再主要基于(重新)表示,而是植根于生命体的动态。通过对比这些方法,我们可以清楚地了解当今意向性的研究方式。一方面,在认知科学中,特别是在古典计算理论中,意图性被认为是形式-句法因果关系的问题。另一方面,互动主义者的方法则提供了更像梅洛-庞蒂的观点,其中强调了自治,体现和互动。

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