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Game Analysis between Governments and Food Corporations in Food Supply Chain with Consumers' Prosecution

机译:消费者起诉下食品供应链中政府与食品企业之间的博弈分析

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In order to provide a quantitative tool in how governments supervise food corporations, this paper constructs game model between governments and food corporations when there is prosecution existing in the food supply chain. We can reach the pure strategy Nash equilibrium solution and the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solution in different circumstances, and then contrast the differences of game results between scenarios with prosecution and non-prosecution scenarios. The results show that the payoffs and costs of governments, food corporations in food supply chain can influence the equilibrium results, and consumers' prosecution can decrease the probability that governments supervise food corporations.
机译:为了提供定量的政府监督食品公司的工具,本文在食品供应链中存在起诉的情况下,构建了政府与食品公司之间的博弈模型。我们可以得出在不同情况下的纯策略纳什均衡解和混合策略纳什均衡解,然后对比有起诉和非起诉场景之间的博弈结果差异。结果表明,食品供应链中政府,食品公司的收益和成本可以影响均衡结果,而消费者的起诉可以降低政府监督食品公司的可能性。

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