Design of a Material Control and Accounting System to Protect against Concealment of Diversion by Falsification and Collusion.

摘要

The report provides guidance for incorporating checks and balances in a nuclear material control and accounting (MC&A) system to control and detect falsification of data and reports that could conceal diversion of nuclear material. Data falsifications may be difficult to distinguish from mistakes in the data. The elements of control for data falsification are similar to existing security and accounting internal controls. Potential mechanisms for data falsification are identified and internal controls are discussed. Process monitoring systems supplement traditional MC&A by providing more timely detection of diversion and improved localization of losses, thereby providing additional controls against data falsification. However, there is a tradeoff in that personnel who have access to material are generating data for MC&A. Possibilities for collusion involving a person having both physical protection and MC&A responsibilities and another person having MC&A responsibilities are identified. Methods for protecting the system against a collusion threat are discussed.