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Steering patients to safer hospitals? The effect of a tiered hospital network on hospital admissions.

机译:指导病人安全的医院?分层网络医院的医院招生。

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To determine if a tiered hospital benefit and safety incentive shifted the distribution of admissions toward safer hospitals.A large manufacturing company instituted the hospital safety incentive (HSI) for union employees. The HSI gave union patients a financial incentive to choose hospitals that met the Leapfrog Group's three patient safety "leaps." The analysis merges data from four sources: claims and enrollment data from the company, the American Hospital Association, the AHRQ HCUP-SID, and a state Office of the Insurance Commissioner.Changes in hospital admissions' patterns for union and nonunion employees using a difference-in-difference design. We estimate the probability of choosing a specific hospital from a set of available alternatives using conditional logistic regression.Patients affiliated with the engineers' union and admitted for a medical diagnosis were 2.92 times more likely to select a hospital designated as safer in the postperiod than in the preperiod, while salaried nonunion (SNU) patients (not subject to the financial incentive) were 0.64 times as likely to choose a compliant hospital in the post- versus preperiod. The difference-in-difference estimate, which is based on the predictions of the conditional logit model, is 0.20. However, the machinists' union was also exposed to the incentive and they were no more likely to choose a safer hospital than the SNU patients. The incentive did not have an effect on patients admitted for a surgical diagnosis, regardless of union status. All patients were averse to travel time, but those union patients selecting an incentive hospital were less averse to travel time.Patient price incentives and quality/safety information may influence hospital selection decisions, particularly for medical admissions, though the optimal incentive level for financial return to the plan sponsor is not clear.
机译:确定一个医院效益和分层安全动机转移的分布招生向更安全的医院。制造公司制定了医院工会员工的安全激励(HSI)。溪给联盟病人金融的动机选择医院,会见了超越集团三个病人安全“飞跃”。数据来源于四个方面:索赔和登记公司的数据,美国医院协会,AHRQ HCUP-SID和状态办公室的保险专员。联盟和住院的模式不属于工会的员工使用法设计。选择的概率从一个特定的医院一组可用的替代品使用条件逻辑回归。医学工程师工会和承认诊断是2.92倍更有可能选择一个医院指定为postperiod更安全比preperiod,薪水的骨折不愈合(SNU)患者(不受金融激励)0.64倍选择兼容与preperiod后的医院。法估计的基于预测的条件分对数模型,是0.20。也暴露在激励他们比没有更倾向于选择更安全的医院SNU病人。手术对病人的影响诊断,无论工会的地位。患者不愿意旅行时间,但这些联盟激励病人选择医院不反对旅行时间。激励和质量/安全信息影响医院的选择决策,尤其是医疗招生,虽然最优激励水平经济回报该计划赞助还不清楚。

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