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首页> 外文期刊>Working Paper Series. Monetary Economics >TEMPORARY INVESTMENT TAX INCENTIVES: THEORY WITH EVIDENCE FROM BONUS DEPRECIATION
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TEMPORARY INVESTMENT TAX INCENTIVES: THEORY WITH EVIDENCE FROM BONUS DEPRECIATION

机译:临时投资税收优惠:有证据表明奖金贬值

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摘要

Investment decisions are inherently forward-looking. The payoff of acquiring capital goods, particularly long-lived capital goods, is governed almost exclusively by events in the far future. Because the timing of the investment itself does not affect future payoffs, there are strong incentives to delay or accelerate investment to take advantage of predictable intertemporal variations in cost. For sufficiently long-lived capital goods, these incentives are so strong that the intertemporal elasticity of investment demand is nearly infinite. As a consequence, for a temporary tax change, the shadow price of long-lived capital goods must reflect the full tax subsidy regardless of the elasticity of investment supply. While price data provide no information on the elasticity of supply, they can reveal the extent to which adjustment costs are internal or external to the firm. In contrast, the elasticity of investment supply can be inferred from quantity data alone. The bonus depreciation allowance passed in 2002 and increased in 2003 presents an opportunity to test the sharp predictions of neoclassical investment theory. In the law, certain types of long-lived capital goods qualify for substantial tax subsides while others do not. The data show that investment in qualified properties was substantially higher than for unqualified property. The estimated elasticity of investment supply is high--between 10 and 20. Market prices do not react to the subsidy as the theory dictates. This suggests either that internal (unmeasured) adjustment costs play a significant role or that measurement problems in the price data effectively conceal the price changes. While the policy noticeably increased investment in types of capital that benefited substantially from bonus depreciation, the aggregate effects of the policy were modest. The analysis suggests that the policy may have increased output by roughly 0.1 percent to 0.2 percent and increased employment by roughly 100,000 to 200,000 jobs.
机译:投资决策本质上是前瞻性的。获得资本货物,特别是长期资本货物的收益,几乎完全取决于在不久的将来发生的事件。由于投资的时机本身不会影响未来的收益,因此有强烈的动机来延迟或加速投资,以利用可预测的跨期成本变化。对于寿命足够长的资本货物,这些激励措施是如此强大,以至于投资需求的跨期弹性几乎是无限的。结果,对于暂时​​性的税收变更,长期的资本货物的影子价格必须反映全部税收补贴,而与投资供应的弹性无关。虽然价格数据没有提供有关供应弹性的信息,但它们可以揭示调整成本在公司内部还是外部的程度。相反,投资供给的弹性可以仅从数量数据中推断出来。 2002年通过并在2003年增加的奖金折旧津贴为检验新古典投资理论的敏锐预测提供了机会。根据法律,某些类型的长期资本货物有资格获得大量税收补贴,而其他则没有。数据显示,对合格房产的投资要比不合格房产的投资高得多。据估计,投资供给的弹性很高,介于10到20之间。市场价格对补贴没有反应。这表明内部(未计量的)调整成本起着重要作用,或者价格数据中的计量问题有效地掩盖了价格变化。尽管该政策显着增加了从红利折旧中大量受益的资本类型的投资,但该政策的总体效果不大。分析表明,该政策可能使产出增加了约0.1%至0.2%,并增加了约100,000至200,000个就业机会。

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