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No one is alone: Strategic complementarities, capacity utilization, growth, and distribution

机译:没有人一个人:战略互补,能力利用,增长和分配

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A longstanding criticism to Keynesian and Kaleckian growth theories is the question: why would firms operating with underutilized capacity accumulate capital stock? Our answer hinges on firms' utilization choices depending on their beliefs about the level of demand, as captured by aggregate utilization. In a simple growth and distribution model, we show that: (i) desired utilization is endogenous to beliefs; and (ii) the equilibrium utilization rate is inefficiently low. We then turn to different model closures to draw policy implications: (iii) with a Classical closure, equilibrium growth and profitability are both strictly below their efficient values; (iv) with a Kaldor/Pasinetti closure, the equilibrium labor share is strictly below the value corresponding to efficient utilization. Spending policies can be used to achieve the efficient outcome. Finally, we use state-by-sector BEA data to validate our hypothesis: estimation results provide strong and robust support for our model in the US. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译:长期以来对凯恩斯主义和卡莱克主义增长理论的批评是一个问题:为什么产能利用率不足的企业为什么会积累资本存量?我们的答案取决于企业的利用率选择,这取决于他们对需求水平的信念,即总利用率。在一个简单的增长和分配模型中,我们表明:(i)期望的利用是信念的内生; (ii)平衡利用率很低。然后,我们转向不同的模型封闭以得出政策含义:(iii)对于经典封闭,均衡增长和盈利能力都严格低于其有效价值; (iv)采用卡尔多/帕西内蒂封闭法时,均衡劳动份额严格低于与有效利用相对应的值。支出政策可用于实现有效结果。最后,我们使用逐个部门的BEA数据来验证我们的假设:估计结果为我们在美国的模型提供了强大而有力的支持。 (C)2019 Elsevier B.V.保留所有权利。

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