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Signal Processing for Indian and Pakistan Nuclear Tests Recorded at IMS Stations Located in Israel

机译:以色列IMS站记录的印度和巴基斯坦核试验的信号处理

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— In compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty (CTBT) the International Monitoring System (IMS) was designed for detection and location of the clandestine Nuclear Tests (NT). Two auxiliary IMS seismic stations MRNI and EIL, deployed recently, were subjected to detectability, travel-time calibration and discrimination analysis. The study is based on the three recent 1998 underground nuclear explosions: one of India and two of Pakistan, which provided a ground-truth test of the existing IMS. These events, attaining magnitudes of 5.2, 4.8 and 4.6 correspondingly, were registered by many IMS and other seismic stations.¶The MRNI and EIL broadband (BB) stations are located in Israel at teleseismic distances (from the explosions) of 3600, 2800 and 2700 km, respectively, where the signals from the tests are already weak. The Indian and the second Pakistan NT were not detected by the short-period Israel Seismic Network (ISN), using standard STA/LTA triggering. Therefore, for the chosen IMS stations we compare the STA/LTA response to the results of the more sensitive Murdock-Hutt (MH) and the Adaptive Statistically Optimal Detector (OD) that showed triggering for these three events. The second Pakistan NT signal arrived at the ISN and the IMS stations in the coda of a strong Afghanistan earthquake and was further disturbed by a preceding signal from a local earthquake. However, the NT signal was successfully extracted at EIL and MRNI stations using MH and OD procedures. For comparison we provide the signal analysis of the cooperating BB station JER, with considerably worse noise conditions than EIL and MRNI, and show that OD can detect events when the other algorithms fail. Using the most quiet EIL station, the most sensitive OD and different bandpass filters we tried in addition to detect the small Kazakh chemical 100-ton calibration explosion of 1998, with magnitude 3.7 at a distance approaching 4000 km. The detector response curve showed uprising in the expected signal time interval, but yet was low for a reliable decision.¶After an NT is detected it should be recognized. Spectra were calculated in a 15-sec window including P and P-coda waves. The spectra for the first Pakistan NT showed a pronounced spectral null at 1.7 Hz for all three components of the EIL station. The effect was confirmed by observation of the same spectral null at the vertical component of the ISN stations. For this ground-truth explosion with a reported shallow source depth, the phenomenon can be explained in terms of the interference of P and pP phases. However, the spectral null feature, considered separately, cannot serve as a reliable identification characteristic of nuclear explosions, because not all the tests provide the nulls, whereas some earthquakes show this feature. Therefore, the multi-channel spectral discrimination analysis, based on a spectral ratio of low-to-high frequency energy (in the 0.6–1 Hz and 1–3 Hz bands), and a semblance of spectral curves (in the 0.6–2 Hz band), was conducted. Both statistics were calculated for the vertical component of the ISN stations as well for the three components of the EIL station. The statistics provided a reliable discrimination between the recent NT and several nearby earthquakes, and showed compliance with the former analysis of Soviet and Chinese NT, where nuclear tests demonstrated lower values of energy ratio and spectral semblance than earthquakes. ¶Accurate location of NT requires calibration of travel time for IMS stations. Using known source locations, IASPEI91 travel-time tables and NEIC origin times we calculated expected arrival time for the P waves to the EIL and MRNI stations and showed that the measured arrival time has a delay of about 4 sec. Similar results were obtained for the nearby Pakistan earthquakes. The analysis was complimented by the P travel-time measurements for the set of Semipalatinsk NT, which showed delays of about 3.7 sec to the short-period MBH station which is a surrogate station for EIL. Similar delays at different stations evidence a path- rather than site-effect. The results can be used for calibration of the IMS stations EIL and MRNI regarding Asian seismic events.
机译:—根据《全面禁止核试验条约》(CTBT),设计了国际监测系统(IMS),用于探测和确定秘密核试验(NT)。最近部署的两个辅助IMS地震台站MRNI和EIL进行了可探测性,行进时间校准和判别分析。该研究是基于1998年最近发生的三起地下核爆炸:印度的一处和巴基斯坦的两处,这对现有IMS进行了实地测试。这些事件分别达到5.2、4.8和4.6的强度,已被许多IMS和其他地震台站记录到。MRNI和EIL宽带(BB)台站位于以色列,距地震发生距离为3600、2800和3。 2700 km,测试信号已经很弱了。使用标准STA / LTA触发,短期内的以色列地震台网(ISN)未检测到印度和第二个巴基斯坦北部。因此,对于所选的IMS站,我们将STA / LTA响应与更敏感的Murdock-Hutt(MH)和自适应统计最优检测器(OD)的结果进行比较,后者显示出这三个事件的触发。巴基斯坦的第二个NT信号到达了强烈的阿富汗地震尾声中的ISN和IMS站,并进一步受到本地地震的前一个信号的干扰。但是,使用MH和OD程序在EIL和MRNI站成功提取了NT信号。为了进行比较,我们提供了协作BB站JER的信号分析,其噪声条件比EIL和MRNI差得多,并表明OD可以检测到其他算法失败时的事件。我们使用最安静的EIL站,最敏感的OD和不同的带通滤光片,除了探测1998年的哈萨克小型100吨校准化学爆炸外,在距离4000 km处的震级为3.7。检测器的响应曲线在预期的信号时间间隔内呈上升趋势,但对于可靠的判断而言较低。¶在检测到NT后应予以识别。在包括P和P尾波的15秒窗口中计算光谱。 EIL站的所有三个分量的第一个巴基斯坦NT的光谱在1.7 Hz处均显示出明显的光谱无效。通过在ISN站的垂直分量处观察到相同的频谱零点,可以确认这种效果。对于据报道源深度较浅的地面真爆,可以用P和pP相的干扰来解释这种现象。但是,单独考虑的频谱零位特征不能用作核爆炸的可靠识别特征,因为并非所有测试都提供了零位,而某些地震显示出此特征。因此,基于低频能量与高频能量的频谱比(在0.6-1 Hz和1-3 Hz频带内)和相似的频谱曲线(在0.6-2之间)进行多通道频谱判别分析Hz频段)。这两个统计信息都是针对ISN站的垂直部分以及EIL站的三个部分进行计算的。统计数据提供了对最近的北约地震和附近几次地震的可靠区分,并显示了对前苏联和中国北约的分析的合规性,在这些分析中,核试验显示的能量比和光谱相似度值比地震低。 ¶NT的准确位置需要校准IMS站的旅行时间。使用已知的震源位置,IASPEI91行驶时间表和NEIC原始时间,我们计算了到达EIL和MRNI站的P波的预期到达时间,并显示测得的到达时间有大约4秒钟的延迟。附近的巴基斯坦地震也得到了类似的结果。该分析得到了塞米巴拉金斯克NT组的P行进时间测量的补充,该结果显示到短周期MBH站(作为EIL的替代站)的延迟约为3.7秒。不同站点的类似延误证明是路径效应,而不是站点效应。结果可用于有关亚洲地震事件的IMS站EIL和MRNI的校准。

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