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首页> 外文期刊>Bulletin of the Georgian Academy of Sciences >Analysis of Post-Quantum Cryptography Use in Practice
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Analysis of Post-Quantum Cryptography Use in Practice

机译:量子后密码学在实践中的使用分析

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摘要

Quantum computers are able to destroy most, if not absolutely all conventional cryptosystems that are widely used in practice, specifically, systems based on the problem of factoring integers (e.g., RSA). Some cryptosystems like RSA system with 4 000- bit keys are considered useful to protect classic computers from attacks, but probably absolutely useless against attacks on quantum computers. One of the alternatives are post-quantum systems, systems based on lattices. These systems are known for high security levels based on the worst-case hardness. They are based on the complexity of the problems grids, the main of which is the problem of the shortest vector (SVP). In fact, we consider the approximate option when we find a lattice vector, with the length of a(n) times more than the shortest nonzero vector. ±(n) is the approximation coefficient, n is the lattice size. The best known algorithm for grids problems is LLL algorithm. This algorithm needs polynomial time with approximation factor 2°^a In 1987, Schnorr extended LLL algorithm and improved this approximation ratio, but he increased the performance of the algorithm. Schnorr replaced core of LLL algorithm by blocks of larger size. We analyze the advantages and disadvantages of the lattice based crypto systems. We consider the attacks on these systems and propose defenses against these attacks. These defenses decrease the efficiency of the systems and make the systems inefficient. Cryptosystems based on NTRU allow to implement a directional encryption as well as the digital signature, so it is possible to build a public key infrastructure, which will be fully based on the NTRU cryptosystem. It makes this cryptosystem very important for practical use. So in the article we analyze whether NTRU can be implemented in practice. From our results we can conclude that crypto-system NTRU has such advantages as faster encryption and decryption of the messages, faster key generation and cryptographic resistance compared to RSA The main advantage of this cryptographic system is resistance to quantum computer attacks. Thus, it can be argued that the crypto system NTRU is prospective. But it is also evident from these results that the key in NTRU system is bigger than in RSA that causes loss of efficiency. It should be also noted that the size of the signature in NTRU is not constant. It is also necessary to use concrete parameters for NTRU safety. It is also worth to note that even the right formed signature does not always pass the verification. In the article we also check the safety of NTRUsign without perturbation techniques before it has lost its efficiency in different threat models and show that the system is not secure in CPA model. So, we show that despite the fact that lattice-based cryptosystems for post-quantum period are proposed, the attacks on them are still fixed, and they are not effective enough. Thus, for the creation and implementation of safe and effective lattice-based post-quantum cryptosystems, it is necessary to conduct quite a big work.
机译:量子计算机能够摧毁大多数(即使不是绝对)所有在实践中广泛使用的常规密码系统,特别是基于整数分解问题的系统(例如RSA)。一些具有4,000位密钥的RSA系统之类的密码系统被认为有助于保护经典计算机免受攻击,但对于量子计算机的攻击可能绝对是无用的。备选方案之一是后量子系统,即基于晶格的系统。这些系统基于最坏情况的硬度而具有很高的安全性级别。它们基于问题网格的复杂性,主要是最短向量(SVP)问题。实际上,我们在找到格向量时会考虑近似选项,其长度是最短非零向量的a(n)倍。 ±(n)是近似系数,n是晶格大小。网格问题最著名的算法是LLL算法。该算法需要近似因子为2°^ a的多项式时间。1987年,Schnorr扩展了LLL算法并改进了该近似率,但他提高了算法的性能。 Schnorr用更大的块替换了LLL算法的核心。我们分析了基于格的加密系统的优缺点。我们考虑对这些系统的攻击,并提出针对这些攻击的防御措施。这些防御措施降低了系统的效率,并使系统效率低下。基于NTRU的密码系统允许实现定向加密以及数字签名,因此可以构建完全基于NTRU密码系统的公钥基础结构。这使得该密码系统对于实际使用非常重要。因此,在本文中,我们分析了NTRU是否可以在实践中实现。从我们的结果可以得出结论,与RSA相比,加密系统NTRU具有以下优点:消息的加密和解密更快,密钥生成速度更快,并且具有更强的加密抗性。此加密系统的主要优点是可以抵抗量子计算机攻击。因此,可以认为加密系统NTRU是预期的。但是从这些结果还可以明显看出,NTRU系统中的密钥比RSA中的密钥大,从而导致效率降低。还应注意,NTRU中签名的大小不是恒定的。为了NTRU安全,还必须使用具体参数。还需要注意的是,即使是正确形成的签名也不一定总是通过验证。在本文中,我们还检查了NTRUsign在没有安全技术的情况下的安全性,然后才在不同的威胁模型中失去了效率,并表明该系统在CPA模型中并不安全。因此,我们表明,尽管提出了针对后量子周期的基于格的密码系统的建议,但对它们的攻击仍然是固定的,并且不够有效。因此,为了创建和实现基于安全,有效的基于格的后量子密码系统,有必要进行大量工作。

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