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试论拍卖机制在不良资产处置中的应用

         

摘要

This paper discusses the application of Nash Non-cooperative Equilibrium to the transaction of Non-Performing Loans(NPLs). There are two methods to reach the Nash Equilibrium in the NPL market, public auction and private negotiation. The efficiency of the two methods is explored, it is concluded that private negotiation is more efficient while public auction is more likely to reach a deal. The last part of the paper discusses current capital market in China, especially the Non-Performing Loan market in China.

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