This paper develops an economic model to compare the profitability of three schemes for the licensing of a quali ty -improving technology: fixed fee, royalty and fixed fee plus royalty licensing. It is assumed that the potential licensor and licensee compete in a Cournot duopoly with a linear demand function, zero cost of technology transaction as well as a non - drastic innovation. The analysis is followed by the discussion of consume surplus and social welfare regarding the three different licensing mode, and its trend against the magnitude of the quality - improving innovation. The results show that from the viewpoint of the licensor, royalty licensing is always superior, and licensing occurs only in the case of innova tion of small magnitude under the constraint of fixed fee licensing. However, the consume surplus and social welfare could be maximum once the fixed fee licensing occurs. A numerical example ends this paper with a result that regarding the con sume surplus and social welfare, with the increasing of the magnitude of the innovation, the fixed fee licensing is more su perior to royalty licensing as well as non - licensing.%依据线性反需求函数、零技术交易成本和渐进性创新的假设前提,建立高质量产品生产企业与低质量产品生产企业间质量提高型技术许可模型,在讨论质量差异性条件下Cournot双寡头垄断市场一般均衡的基础上,分别找到并比较了固定费用、提成以及固定加提成等三种许可方式下的最优许可决策、消费者剩余、社会福利及其随质量差异程度的变化趋势.研究结果表明,从技术拥有方角度而言,提成许可总是最优.而在固定费用许可约束下,只有两产品的质量差异程度较小时许可才会发生.但固定费用许可一旦发生,消费者剩余和社会福利却达到最大,并且通过算例说明了企业间的产品质量差异程度越大,固定费用许可较许可前或提成许可的消费者剩余和社会福利优势也越明显.
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