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不同市场结构政府奖惩的再制造供应链比较研究

         

摘要

The authors discussed the question of how the government set up the reward and punishment system for the re-producing supply chain composed by one supplier and one retailer,compared the differences in the field of recovery,retail price and profits of all the parties,studied the different results due to the government reward and punishment based on the Nash balance,the producer leading structure,and the retailer leading structure in this article. The research shows the gov-ernment reward and punishment for the retailers is superior to the producers regardless of any market structure and Nash balance is the market optimal in the field of recovery,retail price and the total profits of the supply chain. But the retailers and producers must be the leader in supply chains if they want to make the best profits. At last,the paper tested and veri-fied the above conclusion with an example.%考虑政府对一供应商一零售商组成的再制造供应链建立奖惩机制的问题。研究对比在每一种市场结构政府对零售商和制造商分别建立奖惩机制时回收率、零售价和各方利润的差异,并横向比较在Nash均衡、制造商领导、零售商领导三种结构下政府奖惩产生的不同效果。研究表明,无论哪种市场结构,政府对零售商奖惩都优于对制造商奖惩;从回收率、零售价、供应链总利润的角度Nash均衡的市场最优,然而零售商利润和供应商利润在各自成为领导者时最优。最后用算例验证以上结论。

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