知识管理中核心员工隐性知识共享激励--基于博弈论的视角

摘要

By constructing the tacit knowledge sharing mechanism model of core employees , the core employees ’ tacit knowledge sharing mechanism is analyzed.Then, the dynamic game model is used to analyze the incentive problem of the core employee ’ s tacit knowledge and some conclusions are put forward as follows: organization incentive level of the core employees ’ tacit knowledge sharing increases with the core employees ’ tacit knowledge sharing cost and the amount of tacit knowledge , and decreases with the original incentive system incentive level; the core employees ’ tacit knowledge sharing rate decreases with the organization knowledge sharing management cost , and increases with their amount of knowledge.%构建核心员工隐性知识共享机制模型，对核心员工隐性知识共享机理进行分析；建立动态博弈模型，分析核心员工隐性知识共享激励问题。研究得出结论：组织对核心员工隐性知识共享的激励水平随着核心员工隐性知识共享成本与拥有的隐性知识量增加而增加，随着原来激励制度中奖励水平的增加而减少；核心员工隐性知识共享率随着组织知识共享管理成本的增加而降低，随着自身拥有知识量的增加而增加。