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制约我国高新区持续发展的博弈论机理研究

         

摘要

For the problems of lack of innovation in China high-tech zones, a game conceptual model based on government, ent-erprises and talents is designed and several cases is selected to explain the mutual game process and the mechanism of restricting China high-tech zones' sustainable development in the paper. The results show that government's involvement in resource allocation will distort the market's resource allocation function, and leads to enterprise's resource mismatching. The dominant position of governments, institutions, state-owned enterprises in the process of resource allocation will cause lots of talents gather to these departments in natural advantage. Technical barriers and non-technical barriers in the process of industry-research cooperation lead to cooperation cannot be deeply developed. Lack of sharing culture and invalid protection of intellectual property are the most important reasons that restrict information sharing and coordination innovation between enterprises.%针对我国高新区发展过程中存在的创新不足等典型问题,构建了一个基于政府、企业和人才的博弈概念模型,结合典型案例分析了三者之间复杂的互动博弈过程,解释了制约我国高新区持续发展的机理。研究结果表明,政府参与资源配置过程会扭曲市场配置资源的基础性功能,并导致企业对资源的错配;政府、事业单位、国有企业等在资源配置过程中的支配性地位或优势地位,使得人才向这些部门集聚具有天然的优势;产学研合作过程中存在技术性障碍和非技术性障碍导致合作停留在浅层次;共享文化的缺失及知识产权保护的无效性是制约企业之间的资源信息共享与协调创新行为的重要原因。

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