近年来，长三角区域已经成为我国生态环境污染最为严重的区域之一，当地政府加大了环境保护监管力度。在环境监管的过程中，政府和排污企业存在博弈关系。文章考虑地方政府和企业博弈的动态性，建立演化博弈模型，将激励和惩罚机制以及企业的成本考虑在内，根据复试动态方程得到双方行为的演化规律和稳定策略。研究结果表明，企业是否按照严格的标准排污，与政府监管的奖罚力度以及企业引进排污技术成本的高低有关。因此，政府需要积极发挥宏观调控的作用，加强引导和监管；企业要放眼于长期的发展战略，提高自身的社会责任意识，积极配合政府落实保护环境的政策。%General Secretary Xi proposed to take ecological and environmental protection as a top priority of the Yangtze River economic belt, and not to be engaged in large-scale development. Yangtze River Delta region, as the leading region of the Yangtze River economic belt, must give top priority to environmental protection. Since the resis⁃tance between the government and sewage enterprises, there is the game between the Government and sewage compa⁃nies during environmental regulatory process. The game of the local government and sewage enterprises presents dynam⁃ic state, so we establish evolutionary game model and take the incentives and punishment mechanism and corporate cost considerations into consideration, then according to compound dynamic equation gets the evolvement rule and both stability strategy. The results show that the enterprise whether in accordance with the strict emission standards is relat⁃ed to strictness of government’s supervise and rewards and punishments system, as well as the cost of technology im⁃port. Therefore, the government should increase the degree of reward and punishment system, which is beneficial for im⁃proving the level of cooperation of enterprise with government, in this way, to reach the goal to reduce environmental pollution in the area, creating an ecological civilization city.
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