The paper analyzes the causes of earnings management,listed companies seeking the logic of earn-ings management by using asset impairment criteria from a perspective of agency theory. It analyzes the differ-ences between state-owned enterprises and private enterprises in implementing guidelines for asset impairment in combination with our unique ownership structure of capital markets and proposes two hypotheses. H1:after the promulgation of the new guidelines,the application of long-term assets is still affected by the criteria of earnings management motivation;H2:differences in ownership structure result in differences when listed com-panies use long-term assets impairment criteria. Empirical research has been conducted to test the two hypoth-eses with data of 2007-2009 Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies as samples. The empirical re-sults show that from 2007 to 2009,China’s listed companies still managed their earnings by using asset im-pairment,making use of provision for long-term impairment of assets;resell long-term impairment assets so as to realize earnings management motivation such as reversing losses. Differences in ownership structure also have an impact on the execution of corporate guidelines. State-owned enterprises are less efficient than private enterprises in reselling impaired long-term assets for earnings management.%从代理理论的角度分析了盈余管理产生的原因、上市公司利用资产减值准则寻求盈余管理的逻辑关系，结合我国资本市场特有的所有权结构，分析了国有企业和民营企业执行资产减值准则时的区别所在及其根源，并提出两个假设。H1新准则颁布后，长期资产减值准则的应用仍然受盈余管理动机的影响；H2所有权结构的差异，导致上市公司利用长期资产减值准则时有差异。为检验这两个假设，以沪深A股上市公司2007-2009年数据为样本进行了实证研究。实证结果表明：2007-2009年，我国上市公司仍然存在利用资产减值进行盈余管理，利用计提长期资产减值准备、转销减值长期资产以实现扭亏等盈余管理动机的情况；所有权结构的不同对企业准则的执行也有影响，国有企业利用“转销”减值长期资产进行盈余管理的程度显著低于民营企业。
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