强制上网政策下的可再生能源电力供应链收益分配

摘要

为研究强制上网政策对可再生能源电力供应链各主体收益分配的影响,设置从价格或数量进行管制的4种政策情景；基于一个发电企业和一个电网企业组成的两级供应链,建立Stackberg博弈模型,并运用逆向归纳法求出各主体的最优收益；比较分析4种政策下的收益分配结果.研究表明可再生能源发电成本是影响供应链收益分配的关键因子；政府定价或定量可增加供应链主体收益,但不能保障收益合理分配；数量管制有利于实现可再生能源发展目标,价格放松有利于内化额外发电成本.从收益增加和合理分配角度,配额制是可再生能源电力政策重要方向.%Mandatory access policy has a significant impact on the benefit distribution among the renewable electricity supply chain parts.Aiming at the analysis of the effect,four policy scenarios about price or quantity control are set.Based on a two-level supply chain composed of a generator and a grid model,a game model is built by using Stackberg theory,and the optimal benefit of the parties is solved by backward induction.Analysis of the benefit distribution results under four policy scenarios is compared.Results show that the generation cost is a key factor to the benefit distribution.Control policies about price or quality contribute to the benefit improvement,but cannot guarantee the rational allocation.Quantitative control is conducive to the realization of the renewable energy development goals,and price relaxes conducive to the internalization of the additional cost of power generation.It is concluded that the quota policy is the renewable electricity policy direction,in view of benefit increase and distribution.