公平偏好下基于 Stackelberg 博弈的回购契约研究

摘要

A two-stage supply chain composed of a supplier and a retailer is considered .A Stackelberg game model is established for such a supply chain by introducing fairness preference under a buy -back con-tract.Then, by a backward induction method , a research is conducted on how wholesale price is decided , whether buy-back contract can achieve coordination , and how fairness preference impacts the wholesale price .Results show that when the retailer and the supplier are playing Stackelberg game , a buy-back con-tract cannot coordinate the supply chain at all whether they consider fairness preference or not .The whole-sale price decreases as the retailer ’ s fairness preference increases , but it increases as the supplier ’ s fair-ness preference increases .%引入公平偏好，构建了供应商与零售商进行Stackelberg博弈的回购契约模型，采用逆向归纳法分析了批发价的制定、回购契约的协调性以及供应链成员的公平偏好行为对批发价的影响。研究表明：无论是否考虑公平偏好，回购契约都不能实现供应链协调且公平偏好行为不会影响零售商的最优订购量。此外，供应商提供的批发价随着零售商公平偏好系数的增加而降低，但随供应商公平偏好的增加而升高。