基于讨价还价博弈的 ATO 供应链零部件生产及补货策略

摘要

A bargaining cooperative game model for assemble-to-order ( ATO) supply chain composed of a final product manufacturer and two suppliers is proposed to study the component production and replenish -ment policy and the corresponding profit-sharing policy .The effect of participant's bargaining power chain on the optimal solution is analyzed .It is found that ATO supply chain should raise the component produc-tion with the rise of the final product price , and reduce it with the rise of assembly cost of finished product or production cost of components .With the improvement of the bargaining power of final product manufac-turer to one supplier , the transfer price of components and profits of this supplier is reduced , while those of another supplier are increased at the same time .The expected profits of the final product manufacturer in-crease if its bargaining power is stronger than another supplier , and otherwise it reduces .%通过建立ATO供应链中最终产品制造商与其两个供应商间的讨价还价合作模型，研究了ATO供应链的零部件生产补货策略和相应的利润分配策略，并探讨了供应链中各合作主体议价能力对最优解的影响。研究发现，ATO供应链应随着最终产品销售价格的提高而增加零部件产量，随最终产品组装成本或零部件生产成本的提高而减少零部件产量；随着最终产品制造商对其中一个供应商议价能力的增强，该供应商零部件的转移价格及其利润会降低，而另外一个供应商的零部件转移价格和利润会提高；若最终产品制造商比另外一个供应商的议价能力强，其期望利润会得到提高，反之，则会降低。