首页> 中文期刊> 《工业工程》 >基于 Stackelberg 博弈的软件提供商竞争策略:SaaS vs.SWS

基于 Stackelberg 博弈的软件提供商竞争策略:SaaS vs.SWS

         

摘要

为了明晰企业用户对网络存储数据敏感性行为、企业用户转移成本、软件市场网络外部性特征及不同软件交付模式SaaS和SWS的差异对软件提供商竞争策略的影响,从消费者效用角度入手,构建了基于Stackelberg博弈的SWS提供商与SaaS提供商竞争模型。通过采用比较静态分析方法,揭示了外生变量变化对模型均衡解的影响。研究结果表明:存储数据敏感型企业用户比例、转移成本、SaaS模式下企业用户实施成本、竞争双方网络外部性强度的提高对SaaS提供商将会产生不利影响;而前两个外生变量的提高对SWS提供商具有正向的促进作用。同时,考虑到两种模式下企业用户实施成本差异以及SWS自身网络外部性强度对其均衡利润的作用会受到转移成本阈值的影响,因此,对SWS提供商而言,不能一味地降低其客户实施成本或提高自身网络外部性强度。%In order to clarify the effects of customer′s behavior about the stored data-sensitive, the switc-hing cost, the network externality, the product differentiation between SaaS( software as a service) and SWS ( shrink-wrap sofftware ) on the competitive strategies of software vendors, a competitive model be-tween SaaS vendor and SWS vendor based on stackelberg game is constructed from the perspective of con-sumer utility.A comparative statics analysis is presented to show how changes in exogenous variables affect the equilibrium solution.The results show that the proportion of stored data-sensitive customer, switching cost, customer′s implementation cost of SaaS, the intension of network externality of the two parities have a negative effect on SaaS vendor, while the first two exogenous variables have a positive effect on SWS. But as the role of customer′s implementation cost differentiation between SaaS and SWS and the intension of network externality of SWS on the profits of SWS will be subject to a cutoff value of switching cost, it is proposed that SWS vendor can not blindly decrease the implementation cost or increase the intension of net-work externality.

著录项

相似文献

  • 中文文献
  • 外文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号