薪酬差异、高管主动离职率与公司绩效

摘要

本文基于锦标赛理论和公平理论，以总经理与副总经理之间的垂直薪酬差异作为不同级别高管之间的薪酬差异，以副总经理之间的平行薪酬差异作为同级别高管之间的薪酬差异，采用2005－2013年我国 A股上市公司数据，考察了垂直薪酬差异和平行薪酬差异对副总经理的筛选效应。同时，由于不同产权性质企业的高管职位晋升机制和薪酬制度存在差异，这可能会影响薪酬差异对副总经理的筛选效应，因而本文还考察了不同产权性质企业的垂直薪酬差异和平行薪酬差异对副总经理的筛选效应的差异。研究发现，垂直薪酬差异和平行薪酬差异越高，则副总经理主动离职率越高，说明垂直薪酬差异和平行薪酬差异均会对副总经理产生负向的筛选效应；与非国有企业相比，垂直薪酬差异和平行薪酬差异对国有企业副总经理主动离职率的正向影响更大，说明垂直薪酬差异和平行薪酬差异对国有企业副总经理的负向筛选效应要强于非国有企业。进一步研究还发现，垂直薪酬差异和平行薪酬差异均会通过副总经理主动离职率显著地间接负向影响公司绩效，说明垂直薪酬差异和平行薪酬差异对副总经理的筛选效应均会负向影响公司绩效。本文不仅拓展了薪酬差异对高管筛选效应的研究，还为薪酬差异通过高管主动离职行为对公司绩效的影响机制提供了经验证据。%Based on tournament theory and equity theory,this paper takes vertical pay dispersion between CEOs and VPs as pay dispersion between the different levels of execu-tives,and horizontal pay dispersion among VPs as pay dispersion between the same level of executives,and uses the data of A-share listed companies in China from 2005 to 2013,to ex-amine the sorting effects of vertical and horizontal pay dispersion on VPs.At the same time, due to the differences in executive promotion mechanism and compensation system in the en-terprises with different property rights,which may affect the sorting effects of pay dispersion on VPs,this paper also investigates the different sorting effects of vertical and horizontal pay dispersion in the enterprises with different property rights.The results show that greater vertical and horizontal pay dispersion leads to higher voluntary turnover rate of VPs,impl-ying that vertical and horizontal pay dispersion has the negative sorting effects on VPs.Compared with non-state-owned enterprises,the positive effects of vertical and horizon-tal pay dispersion on VPs’voluntary turnover rate are greater in state-owned enterprises,im-plying that vertical and horizontal pay dispersion has greater negative sorting effects on VPs in state-owned enterprises than non-state-owned enterprises.Further study also shows that vertical and horizontal pay dispersion both has significantly negative and indirect impacts on corporate performance through VPs ’ voluntary turnover rate,implying that the sorting effects of vertical and horizontal pay dispersion on VPs have negative impacts on corporate performance.This paper not only extends the research on the sorting effect of pay dispersion on executives,but also provides empirical evidence for the influence mechanism of pay disper-sion on corporate performance through executives’voluntary turnover behavior.