CEO控制权、事务所选择与审计公费

摘要

This article uses A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2014 as the research object to empirically test the rela-tionship among CEO power, auditor choice, audit fee. The results are as folloes:The greater the CEO power, the less likely they are to choose the“big four”, and more likely to choose big domestic offices;The greater the CEO power, the more likely they are to pay lower audit expense;When the factor of self-selection is controlled, the effect of CEO power on audit expense is not obvious in the listed companies audited by the“big four”, whereas in the listed companies audited by the offices which rank top ten internationally or at home, the CEO power is significantly negative related to the audit expense.%本文以2007-2014年A股上市公司为研究对象，实证检验了CEO控制权、事务所选择与审计公费之间的关系。研究发现： CEO 控制权越大，越不倾向选择“四大”，而更倾向选择本土大所； CEO控制权越大，越倾向支付较低的审计公费；控制了事务所自选择后，由“四大”审计的上市公司CEO控制权对审计公费的影响不明显，而由综合排名十大和本土十大审计的上市公司CEO控制权与审计公费显著负相关。