It is a indisputable fact for the extensive existence of overtreament in the medical service market in China. Through building the game model to the behavior of the doctors and patients in medical service market, the paper showed that the reputation mechanism, strictly punishing mechanism can achieve the Nash equilibrium of game and effective inhibition the overtreatment. Furthermore, based on the Realistic analysis of Chinese medical market, this paper showed that it make the implementation of the reputation and punishing mechanism restricted because of the lackness of effective competition which make in loss of the patient choosing doctor right and incentive incompatibility of the supervision. Finally, based on the analysis above, the article put forward the corresponding policy suggestions.%通过对医疗市场中医患行为的博弈分析,得出声誉制约、严厉的惩罚机制等可实现博弈的纳什均衡并有效抑制过度医疗;此外,通过对中国医疗市场的现实分析,认为缺乏有效竞争导致患者丧失择医权和监管的激励不相容使得声誉和惩罚机制的实施受到限制;最后在上述分析的基础上,提出相应的政策建议.
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