Fictional names as necessarily non-referring definitions: A solution for direct reference theory.

摘要

The problem of empty names, that is, the set of problems concerning the relation to the meaning, truth-value, and ontological commitment of statements containing non-referring singular terms is supposedly easily dealt with by descriptivist theories which claim that proper names are disguised definite descriptions. The problem of empty names is thereby averted since statements that contain singular terms are no longer directly predicating properties of an object that does not exist. Rather what these statements really say is that there is some x which has certain properties; the statements express general propositions about states of affairs. Kripke, however, argues that proper names cannot be equivalent to definite descriptions, for this yields the wrong truth-conditions for modal statements. When we examine a particular kind of empty name, fictional names, we find that not only are these names a problem for direct reference theory, they are also a problem for descriptivism. Since descriptivists cannot give a proper account of ordinary names, an account of fictional names consistent with direct reference theory is the best course. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)