Mimam&dotbelow;sakas and Madhyamikas against the Buddhist epistemologists: A comparative study of two Indian answers to the question of justification.

摘要

This dissertation consists in a philosophically constructive engagement with two different critiques of the Buddhist epistemological tradition stemming from Dignāga (c.480–540 CE) and Dharmakīrti (c.600–660 CE). The tradition of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, which was particularly important to the development of pan-Indian canons of reasoned argumentation, may plausibly be characterized as foundationalist. The traditions that follow the epistemologists in deploying these canons of reasoning are often taken as coextensive with or definitive of “philosophy” in classical India. Against this current, the dissertation aims at retrieving and sympathetically elaborating some voices of philosophical dissent from this tradition.; Specifically, the dissertation considers two significant but understudied critiques of the Buddhist epistemologists. First is that of one of the orthodox Brahmanical schools, viz., Pūrva Mīmām&dotbelow;sā, whose constitutive concern is with the interpretation and authority of the earliest Vedic literature. It is argued that the characteristically Mīmām&dotbelow;sā doctrine of “intrinsic validity” is best understood as a critique of the Buddhist tradition of epistemology, and that the Mīmām&dotbelow;sā doctrine is analogous to contemporary “reformed epistemology.” More attention is given to the critique of epistemology advanced by another Buddhist, the Mādhyamika philosopher Candrakīrti (fl. c.650 CE). Unlike that of Mīmām&dotbelow;sā, Candrakīrti's arguments amount to a principled refusal of epistemology. It is argued that the logically distinct character of Candrakīrti's arguments is best understood by characterizing them as transcendental arguments, with this characterization of Candrakīrti's thought facilitating the resolution of what have long been exegetical difficulties in his work. This characterization is meant more generally to advance the idea that there can be principled refusals of epistemological discourse which, insofar as they are based in good reasons for refusing such discourse, deserve to be taken as properly philosophical alternatives to epistemology. Thus, the arguments of these premodern Indian philosophers are not only examined and explicated, but critically assessed, such that they might be seen as representing philosophical interlocutors whose voices can be brought to bear on issues of concern to contemporary philosophers of religion.