PROBLEMS OF METHOD AND SUBJECT MATTER IN THE GENERAL SYSTEM THEORY

摘要

Half a century ago Ludwig von Bertalanffy introduced a new discipline, General SystemrnTheory (GST). He defined the purpose of the new discipline as unification of science and itsrnsubject matter as formulation of general system principles, or principles applicable to allrnsystems. Unfortunately, no such principles have been formulated yet. This paperrndemonstrates that the methods of GST are incapable of producing principles applicable tornall systems. The limitations of the methods were caused by the use of naturalistic ontology,rnwhich represents systems as real objects, or things and assemblages of things.rnThis paper suggests an alternative approach which is based on the assumption that the mainrnpurpose of the system approach is dealing with complexity, and the main method servingrnthis purpose is analysis-synthesis. It is also based on (1) Kant's teaching that system is not arnreal object but a conception of reason; (2) the Activity Approach view that system ontologyrnshould incorporate system methods; and (3) the Aristotelian standard of formulatingrnprinciples by means of opposition.rnThis paper suggests the following methodology for developing system principles. In thernfirst step, by analyzing existing definitions of system, the principal system concepts andrncategorical oppositions should be identified. In the second step, by analyzing classicalrncases, the principle stages of analysis-synthesis and the corresponding systemrnrepresentations should be identified and formulated in terms of the principal systemrnconcepts and categories. In the third step, these stages and representations should bernreformulated in terms of the categorical oppositions to produce two respective types ofrnsystem principles: "regulative" principles of method, and "constitutive" principles ofrnrepresentation. In the final step, the ontological picture of system that incorporates allrnthese principles should be constructed.