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CONOCOPHILLIPS RESPONSE TO THE SATURATE GAS PLANT FIRE AND EXPLOSION INCIDENT

机译:Conocophillips对饱和天然气植物火灾和爆炸事件的反应

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The ConocoPhillips Humber Refinery was first commissioned in 1969. Over subsequent years it has been expanded and its efficiency enhanced. One project was the addition of a Saturate Gas Plant (SGP), designed to improve the recovery of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (propane and butane) and gasolene (petrol components). The SGP was commissioned in 1980. The design included facilities to water wash the feed streams in order to remove inorganic salts which could ultimately cause corrosion and contamination of the products. Soon after commissioning additional water wash was installed in the overhead system, downstream of two main fractionator water draw streams. The additional water wash was designed to flush out soluble deposits which were causing a blockage in the overhead system, these deposits being mainly hydrates. It was not intended to reduce corrosion. These deposits were not totally unexpected. In April 2001 the 6" pipe between the de-ethaniser and the overhead condensers X452/3 failed downstream of the additional overhead system water wash, releasing highly flammable materials which ignited causing significant plant damage. Following the incident ConocoPhillips carried out a Root cause Analysis. The HSE investigation resulted in an Improvement Notice. These are described in the paper and focused on Piping Inspection (Root Based Inspection), Corrosion Management and Management of Change (MOC). ConocoPhillips believed that these actions were the start point. Additional longer term actions are also described in the paper. The Saturate Gas Plant was rebuilt to current design standards and the overheads system water injection was relocated between the two overheads heat exchangers. The paper describes the monitoring that was initiated and proposed long term plans. These additional steps are an essential part of the requirements to comply with Regulation 4 of COMAH. This being achieved by the implementation of a comprehensive Risk Based Inspection process that includes input from inspection, corrosion engineers and operating staff. This process starts at the initial review developing inspection plans, inspection results and a re-evaluation of the original review conclusions.
机译:康菲亨伯炼油厂最早是在1969年委托在随后的几年中它已经扩大和效率提高。其中一个项目是增加的饱和气源厂(SGP),旨在提高液化石油气(丙烷和丁烷)在汽油和(汽油组分)的恢复。在SGP被委托于1980年设计包括设施,以水冲洗进料以除去无机盐流,其可能最终导致产品的腐蚀和污染。不久调试另外的水洗涤后,安装在塔顶系统中,两个主分馏水拉伸流的下游。该另外的水洗涤的目的是冲洗掉其中是在塔顶系统造成堵塞可溶性沉积物,这些沉积物主要是水合物。它的目的不是为了减少腐蚀。这些存款并非完全出乎意料。在2001年4月6" 去ethaniser和塔顶冷凝器X452 / 3次失败的额外开销系统水洗涤的下游,释放出点燃造成显著植物损害高度易燃材料。继入射康菲之间管进行了根本原因分析该HSE调查导致了整改通知。这些在论文中描述,侧重于管道检查(根基于检查),更改的腐蚀管理和管理(MOC)。康菲公司认为,这些行动是起点。其他较长期的动作在文中还描述的饱和和燃气厂重建到目前的设计标准和管理费用系统注水搬迁两者之间的费用热交换器。本文介绍了在开展,并提出长期计划的监督。这些额外的步骤被要求的基本部分以符合COMAH的第4条,这是ACH通过全面的基于风险的检验过程,包括从检查,腐蚀工程师和操作人员输入的实施ieved。这个过程开始于初次审议制定检查计划,检查结果和原来的审查结论进行重新评估。

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