首页> 外文会议>Annual meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management >DOE/DHS INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM CYBER SECURITY PROGRAMS: A MODEL FOR USE IN NUCLEAR FACILITY SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY
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DOE/DHS INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM CYBER SECURITY PROGRAMS: A MODEL FOR USE IN NUCLEAR FACILITY SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY

机译:DOE / DHS工业控制系统网络安全计划:用于核设施安全保障和安全的模型

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Many critical infrastructure sectors have been investigating cyber security issues for several years especially with the help of two primary government programs. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National SCADA Test Bed and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Control Systems Security Program have both implemented activities aimed at securing the industrial control systems (ICSs) that operate the North American electric grid along with several other critical infrastructure sectors. These programs have spent the last 7 years working with industry including asset owners, educational institutions, standards and regulating bodies, and control system vendors. The programs' common mission is to provide outreach, identification of cyber vulnerabilities to ICSs, and mitigation strategies to enhance security postures. The success of these programs indicates that a similar approach can be successfully translated into other sectors including nuclear operations, safeguards, and security. The industry regulating bodies have included cyber security requirements and in some cases, have incorporated sets of standards with penalties for noncompliance such as the North American Electric Reliability Corporation Critical Infrastructure Protection standards. These DOE and DHS programs that address security improvements by both suppliers and end users provide an excellent model for nuclear facility personnel concerned with safeguards and security cyber vulnerabilities and countermeasures. It is not a stretch to imagine complete surreptitious collapse of protection against the removal of nuclear material or even initiation of a criticality event as witnessed at Three Mile Island or Chernobyl in a nuclear ICS inadequately protected against the cyber threat.
机译:多年来,许多重要的基础设施部门一直在研究网络安全问题,尤其是在两个主要的政府计划的帮助下。美国能源部(DOE)国家SCADA测试台和美国国土安全部(DHS)控制系统安全计划都实施了旨在保护运行北美电网的工业控制系统(ICS)的活动,此外还开展了一些活动。其他重要的基础设施部门。这些计划在过去的7年中一直与资产所有者,教育机构,标准和监管机构以及控制系统供应商等行业合作。该计划的共同任务是提供扩展,识别ICS的网络漏洞以及缓解策略以增强安全状况。这些计划的成功表明,类似的方法可以成功地转化为其他领域,包括核行动,保障和安全。行业监管机构已经包含了网络安全要求,并且在某些情况下,还纳入了一些带有违规处罚的标准,例如北美电力可靠性公司的关键基础设施保护标准。这些DOE和DHS计划解决了供应商和最终用户的安全改进问题,为关心保障和安全网络漏洞与对策的核设施人员提供了一个很好的模型。可以想像不到彻底的保护性彻底崩溃以防止移走核材料,甚至引发严重事件,就象在核ICS中在三英里岛或切尔诺贝利没有充分防范网络威胁的情况所见证的那样。

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